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READING THE TEXT OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE:
"TO BE" OR NOT "TO BE"?

Jeremy A. Blumenthal

INTRODUCTION

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment reads simply.
"In all criminal prosecutions," it says, "the accused shall enjoy the
right.., to be confronted with the witnesses against him."' But the
meaning of this facially simple language has proved elusive, leading
to schisms in the Supreme Court's interpretation of the rights afforded by the Sixth Amendment.

For instance, during two of the most recent Supreme Court
Terms, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, has dissented from
the denial of certiorari in cases involvin the Confrontation Clause.!
In the first of these, Danner v. Kentucky, the defendant invoked his
right "to confront his accuser" when the trial court allowed the complaining witness, defendant's fifteen-year-old daughter, to testify via
closed-circuit television.4 A year later, Marx v. Texad involved a similar situation, in which the trial court granted a prosecution motion
for a thirteen-year-old girl to testify via closed-circuit television, after
hearing testimony that the girl might suffer distress from testifying in
open court in the defendant's presence. 6 As in his dissent in Mary. Jeremy A. Blumenthal,J.D. candidate, 2001, University
of Pennsylvania Law School; A.B.,
1991, A.M., 1998, Ph.D. candidate, Harvard University. This Comment is dedicated to Daniel
Eric Bernstein Blumenthal, and to the memory of one of his namesakes, Eli B. Blumenthal. I
would like to thank Professor Richard Friedman and Damon Hewitt for feedback on early drafts
of the Comment, Christopher Murray for his work as Articles Editor, andJudy Bernstein for her
continuous help and support. Flaws that remain are likely due to my stubbornness in not taking one of their suggestions.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2 Marx v. Texas, 528 U.S. 1034 (1999) (Scalia,J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari); Danner v. Kentucky, 525 U.S. 1010 (1998) (Scalia,J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
3 525 U.S. 1010
(1998).
4 Id. at 1011. Justice Scalia objected that the trial court's
finding about the need to protect
the child witness was based on her "vague [] protest[ations] that she could not be near" the defendant while testifying. Id. at 1010.
5 528 U.S. 1034 (1999).
6 Id. at 1038. AsJustice Scalia pointed out, the testimony
was far from conclusive: the girl's
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land v. Craig,7 the 1990 case that set the constitutional standard for

such rulings, Justice Scalia argued that permitting a child witness to
testify via closed-circuit television in order to avoid the trauma of being in the immediate presence of the defendant violated what he saw
as the defendant's absolute right to the face-to-face confrontation
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. s
Craighad condoned such proceedings, in appropriate situations,
in order to balance that important Confrontation Clause right with
public policy considerations that merited departing from it, primarily
the State's compelling interest in protecting children.9 Writing for
the majority, Justice O'Connor stated that "[t]his interpretation derives not only from the literal text of the Clause, but also from [the
Court's] understanding of its historical roots."'0 This more interpretive reasoning, in Justice Scalia's view, "subordinat[ed] ...explicit
constitutional text to currently favored public policy"" in an impermissible manner.12
But the debate over the proper scope and reading of the Confrontation Clause has not been limited to cases involving children. 3

mother testified that her daughter "could probably" testify, id.at 1036, and a doctor w'ho had
examined the girl testified that she "would probably testify okay." although she "couldn't say for
sure that there would not be" distress, id. at 1037.
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (O'Connor, J.). Craig involved closely similar
facts: pursuant to a Maryland statute, a six-year-old girl was allowed to testify via closed-circuit
television upon the trial court's determination "that testimony by the child victim in the courtroom [would] result in the child suffering serious emotional distress such that the child [couldl
at 841.
not reasonably connunicate." RI.
9 See Craig 497 U.S. at 860-70 (Scalia, J., dissenting); cf. Coy v. Iowa, 187 U.S. 1012 (1988)
(Scalia, J.) (holding unconstitutional a trial procedure that allowed child wiMesses to testify
behind a screen). In Coy, James Avery Coy was accused of sexually assaulting two thirteen-)x-arold girls. Over Coy's Sixth Amendment objection, tle trial court approved the use, pursuant to
Iowa statute, of a screen behind which the girls could testify, in view of the jury and in partial
view of the defendant, but without being able to see him. Id. at 101.-115.
9 See Craig 497 U.S. at 852-55; see also Spigarolo v. Meadsum, 93-1 F.2d 19. 2.23 (2d Cir.
1991) (holding that a Connecticut statute alloing videotaped testimony of child witnesses in
sexual abuse cases was constitutional given the State's compelling interest in protecting the
children). See generally Annotation, Closai-Circuit TeLeision titnrs Exarnination. 61 A.LR. 4th
1155 (Supp. 2000) (collecting and analyzing cases addressing whether closed-circttit television
can be used to present the testimony of witnesses who are not physically in the courtroom).
30 Craig,497 U.S. at 844.
" Id. at 861 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
12 See Marx v. Texas, 528 U.S. 1034, 1035 (1999) (Scalia, J.. dissenting front denial of certiorari) ("I do not think the Court should ever depart from the plain meaning of tile Bill of
Rights"); Co, 487 U.S. at 1021 (emphasizing face-to-face confrontation as the 'irreducible literal meaning of the clause"); cf.Cline v. State, 36 S.W. 1099, 1104 (Tex. Crim. App. 1896) (rejecting tests that would balance Constitutional rights against public policy on te grounds that
"[n]ecessity that is higher than the Constitution can safely have no place in Americanjutisprudence"), oveduled by Porch v. State, 99 S.W. 1122 (Tex. Crim. App. 1907). &e grnraalrCornelius
M. Murphy, Note, Justice Scalia and the Confrontation Clause. A Case Study in OriginalistAdjudication of IndividualRights, 34 AM. CalM. L RE%. 1243, 1256-58 (1997) (reviewing favorably Scalia's
text-based, "shin-kicking" dissent in Craig).
isCf.Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A IBlpe of the Hands,A Lic, of the Lips: The Validlry
of Den'.eanor
Evidence in Assessing 1itness Credibility, 72 NEB. L RE . 1157, 1180 n.140 (1993) (suggesting the
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Commentators have noted the ease with which the Craig decision
could be expanded to other classes of witnesses.'4 For instance, some
suggest extending the Craigrationale to groups such as the elderly or
the disabled.'5 Courts' tolerance for the practice has been mixed:
some have been reluctant to thus broaden the Craig reading;" more
recently, a District Court allowed testimony by two-way closed-circuit
television in a criminal case by
7 a terminally ill witness in the Federal
Witness Protection program.
Another, more thoroughly analyzed line of cases implicating
adults and the Confrontation Clause involves the admissibility of incriminating statements by one co-defendant against another during a
joint trial.' In Bruton v. United States,'9 the Court held that testimony
by a third party that a non-testifying defendant, Evans, had confessed
to a robbery and implicated himself and a co-defendant, Bruton, violated the Confrontation Clause by precluding Bruton's right to crossexamine the witnesses against him (i.e., Evans). This constitutional
prohibition on the admission of a non-testifying defendant's confession at a joint trial, even when edited or redacted, was repeated in
subsequent cases, but led to some disagreement in 1987 in Richardson
2°
v. Marsh.
In Marsh, the prosecution introduced such a confession
that had been edited not only to eliminate Marsh's name, but to
eliminate any reference to her at all. Challenged on Confrontation
Clause grounds, admission of the confession was nevertheless upheld
because, by eliminating any reference to Marsh, it was not sufficiently
possibility of a distinction in Confrontation Clause cases involving minors and non-minors).
,See, e.g., Ralph H. Kohlmann, The Presumption of Innocence: Patching
the Tattered Cloak After
Maryland v. Craig, 27 ST. MARY'S L.J. 389, 402-05 (1996) (citing cases in which alternative forms
of testimony were used for witnesses other than children);Jacqueline Miller Beckett, Note, 'The
True Value of the Confrontation Clause: A Study of Child Sex Abuse Trial, 82 GEo. L.J. 1605, 1610-41
(1994) (arguing that Craigopenedthe door to alternative forms of testimony for other types of
witnesses).
15 See, e.g.,J. Steven Beckett & Steven
D. Stennett, The Elder Witness-The Admissibility of Closed
Circuit Television Testimony After Maryland v. Craig, 7 ELDER L.J. 313 (1999).
16 E.g., Stoner v. Sowders, 997 F.2d 209 (6th Cir. 1993) (granting habeas petition on grounds
that trial court had admitted videotaped testimony of two elderly witnesses in violation of defendant's
Confrontation Clause rights).
17 See United States v. Gigante, 971 F. Supp. 755 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), affd 166 F.3d 75 (2d Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1114 (2000). For criticism of the Gigante decision, see Cathleen J.
Cinella, Comment, Compromisingthe Sixth Amendment Right to Confrontation-UnitedStates v. Gigante, 32 SuFFoLK U. L. REv. 135 (1998).
i8 See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999) (holding that an accomplice's tape-recorded
confession to the police could not be admitted as evidence because it did not fit a firmly rooted
exception to the hearsay rule); Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185 (1998) (holding that the redacted confession of a nontestifying defendant that named defendant as the perpetrator could
not be admitted at trial); Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987) (finding no Confrontation
Clause violation in admitting nontestifying co-defendant's confession where confession was redacted to eliminate any reference to defendant and jury was instructed not to use confession
against her); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (holding that the admission at joint
trial of co-defendant's confession implicating defendant constituted prejudicial error).
19 391 U.S. 123
(1968).
90 481 U.S. 200 (1987).
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incriminating to her as to require cross-examination on her part.2' In
dissent, however, Justice Stevens rejected this reasoning, arguing that
it "demean[ed] the values protected by the Confrontation Clause."
Those values, Justice Stevens suggested, required the opportunity for
cross-examination even given the redacted confession, because of the
possibility that thejurywould use it against her in light of additional
prosecution evidence. Most recently, disagreement about this line
of co-defendant confession cases has led to calls both by members of
the Court and by commentators for reconsideration of the Confrontation Clause jurisprudence as "both too narrow and too broad."2'
Interpretation of the Clause has thus been a matter of ongoing
dispute, despite its "plain" text.5 Indeed, it is clear that despite the
fact that the Clause was only minimally debated before ratification,
and despite the "faded parchment"2 on which its history is allegedly
written, it has played, and continues to play, an important role in case
law concerning defendant rights,judicial discretion, and the precarious balancing of constitutional rights against developing policy innovations. In efforts to resolve such balancing issues and in light of this
ongoing disagreement, numerous commentators have reviewed the
history of the confrontation right from ancient times through common law and up to the present, seeking to ascertain its true meaning
and intent. s In the traditional view, the right to confrontation developed as an American response to procedural abuses in seventeenth-

M at 208.
- Id. at 212 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
Id. at 214 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
4 SeeLillyv. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 140-41 (1999) (Breyerj., concurring) (listing conmentators).
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237,243 (1895) (stating that strict textual interpremion
must occasionally be influenced by public policy and the necessities of the particular case).
-6 See Howard W. Gutman, Academic Detenninismn: The Division
of the Bill of Rights, 54 S.CAL. L
REv. 295,332 n.181 (1981) (claiming that the Confrontation Clause %%as only debated for five
minutes before its adoption).
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 173-74 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (arguing that
history does not dearly indicate the intended scope of the Confrontation Clause).
28 See Frank R. Herrmann & Brownlow I.Speer, Fadngthe AecuLse
Anunt and Mrdieval Precursors of the Confrontation Clause 34 VA.J. INT'L L 481 (1994) (examining historical antecedents of the notion of face-to-face confrontation); Daniel H. Pollitt, Tie Right of Cvftontatie:
Its History and Modern Dress, 8J. PuB. L 381 (1959) (discussing the history of the right to confrontation); Anne Rodey, The Sixth Amendent Right of Defendents [sic] to Conftont Aderse Iitnesses 26 Aht. CRia. L REv. 1547 (1989) (same); Daniel Sha\iro. The Confiontation Clause Today
in Light of Its Common Law Background, 26 VAL. U. L REv. 337 (1991) (reimuing the Supreme
Court's approaches to interpreting the Confrontation Clause). A thorough reicw of tie historical readings of the Confrontation Clause appears in Robert P. Mosteller, Rrm.ahing Confrontation Clauseand Hearsay Doctrine Under the Challenge of Child Sexual Abuse Pmw-uliou%1993 U. ILL
L REV. 691. Far broader histories appear in 30 CHARLES ALAN, WRIGHT & KENNETH W.
GRAHAM,JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE §§ 63-11-6348 (West 1997) (giing
historical account of background to hearsay rules) and 30A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENLTH
W. GRAHAMJR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE §§ 6355-6374 (Wvest 2000) (giving historical account of background to confrontation clause).
-1
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century English trials, typified by the trial-by-absent-accuser of Sir
Walter Raleigh in 1603.Some commentators, however, believe that the Clause is less
autonomous than the traditional account assumes, arguing instead
for an "alternative" history that conjoins the Clause with other guaranteed features of an adversarial system.3° Still others have sought to
apply these histories to questions of legal and social policy, such as
jury instructions about demeanor evidence,3' prosecutorial misconduct, 3 - the overlap between the Clause and the rule against hearsay, 3
and, reflecting some of the Court's disagreement, the accommodations made for child witnesses in child sexual abuse cases.' Relatively
E.g., Roger W. Kirst, The ProceduralDimension of Confrontation Doctrine,66 NEB. L. REV. 485,
490 (1987). But see infra note 71 (contrasting ordinary criminal trials to the more commonly
discussed treason trials, such as that of Sir Walter Raleigh). Other commentators propose that
colonists emphasized the right in response to the near-inquisitorial prosecutions of the English
vice-admiralty courts that administered the Stamp Act and other customs laws. E.g., Margaret A.
Berger, The Deconstitutionalizationof the ConfrontationClause: A Proposalfora ProsecutorialRestraint
Mode 76 MINN. L. REv. 557, 578-80 (1992); Pollitt, supra note 28; see also infra notes 81-84 and
accompanying text30 See Randolph N.Jonakait, Restoring
the ConfrontationClause to the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA
L. REv. 557, 581-82 (1988) (suggesting that the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation developed in the context of an emerging American adversarial system); see also 30 WRIHT &
GRAHAM, supra note 28, § 6346 n.8 and accompanying text ("[C]onfrontation did not stand
alone; it was viewed as one of the incidents of trial by jury."); Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: Sixth
Amendment First Principles,84 GEO. L.J. 641 (1996) (suggesting that Sixth-Amendment language
be read in light of the Constitution's other, similar language). Note, however, that taking the
Framers' choices of language and emendations seriously offers one response to this line of reasoning. The Framers were clearly willing-in both open debate and in the Select Committee
charged with shaping the Bill of Rights-to address and debate discretely several of the clauses
included in the Sixth Amendment. See infra notes 120-37 and accompanying text. For instance,
there was an enormous amount of debate about the Amendment's vicinage requirement, but
little or no debate concerning the right to confrontation or to counsel.
:I See generallyBlumenthal, supra note 13.
2 See Berger, supra note 29; Michael
Mukasey, Note, Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule, 75
YALE L.J. 1434, 1439-42 (1966).
33 See Michael H. Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay
Rule, and Child Sexual Abuse
Prosecutions: The State of the Relationship, 72 MINN. L. REV. 523 (1988) (discussing the complexity
of the relationship between the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule); Charles R. Nesson
& Yochai Benkler, ConstitutionalHearsay: RequiringFoundationalTesting and Corroboration Under
the ConfrontationClause, 81 VA. L. REv. 149, 158-62 (1995) (discussing the limitations on tie use
of hearsay and the role of testing evidence to ensure a right to confrontation); Eleanor Swift,
Smoke and Mirrors: The Failureof the Supreme Court'sAccuracy Rationale in White v. Illinois Requires
a New Look at Confrontation,22 CAP. U. L. REv. 145 (1993) (rejecting the Supreme Court's use of
the accuracy rationale in relation to hearsay and confrontation).
See, e.g., Stephen J. Ceci & Richard D. Friedman, The Suggestibility of Children:
Scientific Research and Legal Implications,86 CoRNELL L. REv. 33, 94 (2000); Carol A. Chase, ConfrontingSupreme Confusion: BalancingDefendants' Confrontation Clause Rights Against the Need to Protect Child
Abuse Victims, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 407, 409-21; Graham, supra note 33; Mosteller, supra note 28
(reviewing thoroughly the historical readings of the Confrontation Clause); Myrna S. Raeder,
Navigating Between Scylla and Charybdis: Ohio's Efforts to Protect Children Without Eviscerating the
Rights of Criminal Defendants-Evidentiary Considerations and the Rebirth of Confrontation Clause
Analysis in Child Abuse Cases 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 43 (1994) (analyzing the application of the Confrontation Clause in child abuse cases in Ohio);Julie A. Anderson, Comment, The Sixth Amendment: Protecting Defendants' Rights at the Expense of Child Victims, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 767
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broad, Craiglikeconstructions have been at the heart of arguments in
favor of increasing such legal and social accommodations, seeking to
balance the Clause's intent with practical concerns,' even, critics object, at the expense of a defendant's confrontation rights.~' There are
strong objections to these interpretations that champion a defendant's more robust right to the face-to-face confrontation of prosecution witnesses, objections that have rested on stricter interpretations
of the Clause 7 and are allegedly based on reading the Clause literally.
Justice Scalia's review of the Clause's history,ss for instance, analyzed
the very etymology of the word "confront," contending that that literal reading of the text indicates precisely what its drafters intended."
Yet such "literal" readings championing face-to-face confrontation
as inviolable may, strangely enough, in fact not be based on a literal
reading of the Confrontation Clause. I have discussed elsewhere" the
shortcomings of relying, in certain contexts, on conventional claims
for the Clause's authority, such as President Eisenhower's address
concerning his hometown of Abilene, Kansas,4 and Shakespeare's
language in Richard I.' In this Comment I will address another gap
in the interpretation of the scope and purpose of the Confrontation
(1997) (balancing the child's trauma against the defendant's right to proceed pro se).

35 See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990); Mattox v. United States. 156
U.S. 237. 243
(1895); see also articles cited supra note 34.
See Jean Montoya, On Truth and Shidding in Child Abuse Thials, 43 H.1tSTNS LJ. 1259
(1992) (objecting to such accommodations);Jean Montoya, L.ssonsfrmn Akiki and Michaels on
Shielding Child ilnesses, 1 PSYcHOL. PUB. POL*Y & L 340 (1995) (using social science data to
show that such accommodations do not increase testimonial accuracy); Lynne Celander DeSarbo, Comment, The Danger of Value-Laden In estigalion in Child Sexual Abuse Casu
Are Defendants' ConstitutionalRights Violated Wien Mental Health Professionals Offer Testirny Based on Children's HearsayStatements and Behaviors?,2 U. PA.J. CONST. L 276 (1999) (arguing that admission
of testimony by mental health experts as to statements children made to them siolates rite Confrontation Clause).
37 See Coy v. Iowva, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988) (holding that the Confrontation Clause prosides a
criminal defendant the right to "confront" face-to-face the witnesses gihing eidence against him
at trial); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (holding that a declarant's out-of-court statements may only be admitted if that person is testifying as a witness and subject to full crossexamination, thus satisfying the Sixth Amendment); see also %White". Illinois, 502 U.S. 346. 36465 (1992) (Thomas,J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
ss Coy, 487 U.S. at 1015-20 (tracing the Clause's lineage back to Roman law).
But see Eileen A. Scallen, Constitutional Dimensions of Hearsay Reform:
T uw
a
Three-DimensionalConfrontationClause 76 MINN. L REv. 623, 637-38 (1992) (challengingJustice
Scalia's etymological interpretation).
40 See Blumenthal, supra note 13, at 1183-85 (discussing Justice Scalia's "literal" reading in

CO)4!" Coy, 487 U.S. at 1017-18 ("President Eisenhower once described face-to-face confrontation
as part of the code of his hometown of Abilene, Kansas. In Abilene, he said, it ims necessary to
'[m]eet anyone face to face with whom you disagree. You could not sneak up on him from behind, or do any damage to him, without suffering the penalty of an outraged citizenry.... In
this country, if someone dislikes you, or accuses you, he must come up in front. He cannot hide
behind the shadow.'" (citation omitted)).
Id. at 1016 ("Shakespeare was thus describing the root meaning of confrontation when he
had Richard the Second say. 'Then call them to our presence-face to face, and frowning brow
to brow, ourselves will hear the accuser and the accused freely speak .... " (citation omitted)).
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Clause: the neglect even by "literal" readings of its text to examine
what the text actually says.
Literal readings have focused on the importance both of physically confronting witnesses, 3 and of cross-examining them,44 and the
apparent intent of those seeking to preserve and reify the right to do
so. The Confrontation Clause, however, does not give a defendant
the right to "confront" the witnesses against him, and its language
and history do not suggest that this is what was intended. Rather, the
Clause specifically confers the right "to be confronted with" those witnesses.'5
The distinction between these two phrases is fine but nevertheless
important. Indeed, understanding the difference may help reconcile
some of the disagreement concerning the scope and interpretation of
the Confrontation Clause, especially in child sex-abuse cases such as
6 and
Crai v.
Coy 49
v. Iowc' and in co-defendant cases such as Bruto and
Lilly
Virginia.
Accordingly, this Comment will describe
the slippage between the two phrases and review Supreme Court cases interpreting the Clause as affording a right to "confront." This review will
illustrate how that interpretation has inaccurately led to the conclusion that cross-examination is the focal right afforded by the Clause"0
rather than the narrower function the Confrontation Clause originally served. In doing so I will discuss the limited legislative history of
the Clause and suggest that its debate and ratification reveal that narrower goal. I will trace in part the evolution of the right and its interpretations during pre- and post-Colonial periods, and its judicial
and scholarly glosses since that time, illustrating where interpretation
has strayed from the Clause's original purpose. I then suggest a more
appropriate reading that can show how both the "literal" and "liberal" readings of the Clause are accurate to an extent and how each
captures some part of what the Confrontation Clause was intended to
achieve.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE RIGHT TO BE CONFRONTED

In one sense, the dichotomy between the literal and liberal perspectives of the confrontation right is not so precise. The Court has
43 Id. ("We have never doubted ... that the Confrontation
Clause guarantees the defendant
a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact.")
44 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1397(a) (1) (Chadbourn rev.
1974) (asserting that at common
law the confrontation right was indistinguishable from that of cross-examination).
4
U.S. CoN'sr. amend. VI.

46 497 U.S.
47 487 U.S.
48 391 U.S.
4

836 (1990).
1012 (1988).
123 (1968).
527 U.S. 116 (1999).

0justice Scalia in Coy did differentiate between confrontation and cross-examination,
487
U.S. at 1017, a distinction that the dissenters essentially rejected, see id. at 1028-29 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting). However, his literal reading of "confrontation" equated it with the physical act
of face-to-face confrontation, which was not the whole of the original intent.
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indeed acknowledged that the confrontation right is not absolute and
that exceptions may be allowed under certain circumstances."
"[O]ur precedents recognize a right to face-to-face confrontation at
trial, but have never viewed that right as absolute." This concession
stems from two sources. The first was the Court's decision in Mattox
v. United States,; in which testimony from two deceased witnesses was
admitted at a defendant's retrial, because "th[o]se witnesses were
present and were fully examined and cross-examined on the former
trial." The second was the influential work ofJohn Henry Wigmnore,
who argued that the "essential purpose" of the confrontation right
was to provide for cross-examination;5' indeed, that "[t]here never
was at common law any recognized right to ... confrontation as distinguished from cross-examination." 5 This reading was subsequently
adopted by Justice Harlan, concurring in Dutton v. Evans.7 "If one
were to translate the Confrontation Clause into language in more
common use today, it would read: 'In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to be present and to cross-examine the
witnesses against him.'"ts
These two authorities (Mattox and the "WNigmore-Harlan" ' view)
have laid the groundwork both for those viewing the Clause as more
of a procedural right and those who interpret it less literally, as more
of a substantive right, essentially equating the confrontation right
with a right to cross-examine. 60 For those who read the Clause proceSee, e-g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973) (stating dint some legitinmte
interests in the criminal trial process may outweigh the right to confront and to cross-examine);
Boudjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182 (1987) (articulating a balancing test between the
defendant's confrontation right and society's interest in accurate fact-finding).
52Co;,487 U.S. at 1025 (O'Connor,J., concurring); seeaso Snyder v. Masschusetts,
-91 U.S.
97, 107 (1934) (Cardozo,J.) ("Nor has the privilege of confrontation at any time been %ithout
recognized exceptions ...
156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) (noting that the rights protected in the Bill of Rights were historically understood to be subject to exceptions).
5 Id. at 240.
WIGMOPE, supra note 44, § 1399. But see Mud A. Larkin, The ffight of Confiontation: 1l1hat
Next?, 1 TE. TcH L RE-y. 67, 69 (1969) (rejecting N$ligmore's reading as unsupported by the
authorities that Wigmore cited); 30 WRIGHT & GRAHA., supra note 28. § 6346 n.2 and accompanying text ("Wigmore's history of the right of confrontation is inadequate to a point well beyond falsity.").
WIGMORE, supranote 44, § 1397(a) (1) (emphasis in original).
57 400 U.S. 74,93 (1970) (Harlan,J., concurring).
ss Id. at 95.
59 White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 360 (1992) (ThomasJ., concurring in part and concurring
in thejudgment) (noting that "[t]he Wigmore view was endorsed byjustice Harlan... in Dutton v. Evans" and referring subsequently to the '"ligmore-Harlanview").
60 See Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 22 (1985) (IT]ihe Confrontation Clause
is generally satisfied when the defense is given a full and fair opportunity to... cross-examin[el.");
Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911) ("[The Clause %%as] intended to prevent the
conviction of the accused upon depositions or ex parteaffidavits. and particularly to preserve the
right of the accused to ... cross-examination." (citation omitted)). &r aLso Blumenthal, supra
note 13, at 1186-88 & nn.185-95 (discussing procedural and substantive interpretations of the
Clause and the focus on cross-examination). Here and in the following discussions, I do not
1
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durally, the right is one that brings accuser and accused face-to-face,
in order to "confound and undo the false accuser" through crossexamination and through the effect on a witness of testifying before a
defendant.6' Under the more substantive reading, cross-examination
is again at the core of the goals of the Clause: "[t]he central concern
of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing
in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.'
As discussed further in Part II, the Supreme Court has suggested that
the purpose of confrontation is served by a confluence of its four
elements: "physical presence, oath, cross-examination, and observation of demeanor by the trier of fact." Of course, despite the persistence of the oath's administration to witnesses, it has been criticized
in its ability to make a substantial difference in the validity of a witness's testimony."' Demeanor also, though lauded as a means of
evaluation, clearly can be misleading
is lying. rather than helpful in evaluating whether or not a witness
Further, this "four-element" approach, focusing primarily on
cross-examination, is likely not the most accurate interpretation.
Confrontation was not intended to equal cross-examination, regardless of that common interpretation. Most obviously, despite Justice
Harlan's translation, "it is well to remember that the authors of the
sixth amendment did not provide that 'in all criminal prosecutions
the accused shall enjoy the right... to cross-examine witnesses
against him,' but instead selected"' the broader language actually

mean to suggest that the Court has literally equated the Clause and the right to cross-examine,
to the point that any infringement on the right to cross-examine per se violates the Confrontation Clause. Although the ruling has rather been that the Clause mandates the opportunity to
cross-examine, Fensterer,474 U.S. at 20, it should be clear that the Court, following Wigmore,
has placed cross-examination at the heart of the confrontation right. See infra notes 66-91 and
accompanying text.
61 Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020 (1988) (Scalia,J.). Justice
Scalia did not explicitly equate
the Clause and cross-examination, but he did declare that face-to-face confrontation and crossexamination "serv[e] much the same purpose." Id. at 1019-20.
62 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836,845
(1990).
63 Id. at 846; see also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 69 (1980)
(stating that oath, crossexamination, and demeanor provide "all that the Sixth Amendment demands: 'substantial
compliance with the purposes behind the confrontation requirement'" (quoting California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 166 (1970)). This substantive or functional approach to confrontation,
identifying it with cross-examination, was praised by Blackstone as well. SeeShaviro, supra note
28, at 343 n.37.
See, e.g., Richard H. Underwood, False Witness: A Lawyer's History of the Law
of Pejury, 10
ARIZ.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 215, 218 (1993) ("At times and in places the oath has been relied on
as a guarantee of the truth .... But the ideas which made an oath effective to assure the truth
have at least lost much of their strength .... " (quoting ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 356
(West 1959))).
See generally Blumenthal, supra note 13; Olin Guy wellborn III, Demeanor,
76 CORNELL L.
REV. 1075 (1991) (discussing potential flaws in assessing honesty of trial testimony by means of
a witness's demeanor).
Larkin, supra note 55, at 69-70.
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used. If the Framers had intended the Clause to grant a right to
cross-examination, the language that they chose was clearly inappropriate, "if only because the phrase 'be confronted ith the witnesses
against him' is an exceedingly strange way to express a guarantee of
nothing more than cross-examination."G"
As a historical matter as well, the two rights were clearly viewed
differently. In colonial America, for instance, the Maryland Declaration of Rights afforded the right to "be confronted Nith" adverse itnesses separately from the right to examine them." In a concededly
less explicit example, this distinction mirrors an even older one from
the early eighteenth century: in praising English over Continental
criminal procedure, one English writer noted that in England, witnesses "are produced face to face and deliver their evidence in open
court, the prisoner himself being present, and at liberty to crossexamine them."6
Moreover, despite that "liberty to cross-examine," even in traditional English common law trials, where such cross-examination was
supposedly integral to "confound[ing] and undo[ing]"" a witness before the eyes of the jury, there is little evidence for the early exercise
of the right. Ordinary English trials 7' were typically brief, often with
67 Coyv. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1018 n.2 (1987). ProfessorJonakairhas suggested a somewlht
different interpretation, that, contrary to the traditional readings, "the Confrontation
Clause... constitutionalized [criminal] procedures already used in ie states.: and that
"[d]efense cross-examination was central to this." Randolph N.Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation Clause: An AltenativefHistoiy, 27 RUrGERS LJ. 77,124 (1995). Accordingly. for ProfessorJonaait, "the Sixth Amendment sought to guarantee defense cross-examination in te Confrontation Clause." I. Despite ProfessorJonakait's thorough review, hoever, there seems to
be stronger evidence that cross-examination was not the primary focus of tie Sixth Amendment's Framers, as I discuss infra. Ironically, howev-er, although tie Court has repeatedly denied an intent to so constitutionalize rules of evidence, it has progressively moved in that direction. See infranote 189.
MARYLAND DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, 1 19 (1776) ("[I]n all criminal prosecutions, ever
man hath a right... to be confronted ith the timesses against him.... [and] to examine tie
witnesses for and against him on oath ... .") quoted in THE COMuLETE BILL OF RIGtS: THE
DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, & ORIGINS 403 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997).
69 Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The &archforBasicPrindpli- 86 GO. LJ. 1011. 1023
n.69 (1998) (quoting SOLLON EMLEn, Preface to A COmu'L.EE COLLECTION OF STATE-TRLAuS, AND
PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEIME.ANORS iii-iv (2d ed. 1730)).
70 Coy 487 U.S. at 1020.
71 Professor Langbein has shown in detail that procedure at an ordinary criminal trial was
different from the more commonly discussed treason trials. SeeJohn H. Langbein, The Criinoal
Trial Before the Lauyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 263 (1978). This is an important qualification, because the conventional account of the Confrontation Clause considers it a 'reaction to the perceived injustice of the treason trial of Sir Walter Raleigh in 1603." Shaviro, supra note 28. at
341; see also, eg., Dutton v. E-ans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 n.16 (1970); ALFREDO GARCIA. THE SL'TH
AMENDMENT INMODERN AMERICANJURISPRUDENCE 73 (1992) (discussing "[wihether the nexus
between the Raleigh case and the Sixth Amendment is fact or myth"). But see Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raeigh Loses Another One, 8
Cmi. L Buu 99, 100 nA (1972) (calling the daim that the Raleigh trial led to the Sixth
Amendment a "convenient but highly romantic myth"). Where commentators look to the more
conspicuous treason trials as instantiating a particular trial right. the actual development of
such a right (which may be quite different) might be misrepresented.
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several a day before the samejury,12 and, the records suggest, typically
involved little cross-examination, even when formal witnesses were
brought.73 This remained so until the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; it was only over those decades that defense counsel
gradually incorporated the skill of examining witnesses into their
repertoire. In fact, by the early part of the nineteenth century, the
primary function of the English defense attorney was indeed crossexamination.' This function, however, seemed to be conceived as
less of a positive right than as a palliative for the prohibition on defense counsel addressing the jury-that is, absent any other means of
conveying to the jury a defendant's story, counsel was forced "either
to cross-examine or do nothing.' '76 Moreover, because defense counsel were further constrained by not being entitled to view witness
depositions, cross-examination could be a hazardous undertaking
that could easily backfire: "If the witness were honest, had told all he
or she knew, and would not be intimidated, then the inevitable result
of the cross-examination was to reinforce the prosecution case."" In
contrast to these relatively late, qualified developments, however, the
"right" to face-to-face confrontation can be traced in treason cases "
and in English statute at least back to the mid-sixteenth century,7 and
perhaps as far back as the early thirteenth century."0
A similar situation existed in colonial America immediately before
the Revolution. One thread of historical analysis of the right to confrontation traces it as a reaction to the near-inquisitorial procedures
of the admiralty courts in the second half of the eighteenth century.'
These procedures were in turn reactions to a growing tendency toward jury nullifications.8- With juries in colonial courts refusing to
convict merchants and others caught violating what they perceived as
unconstitutional laws constraining shipping, the English Parliament
" See, e.g., Langbein, supranote 71, at 277-78 (observing that during a
typical two-day session
at the Old Bailey in 1678, thirty-two cases were processed to verdict, all of them full trials on
pleas of not guilty); see a/soJohn H. Langbein, The English Criminal TialJury on the Eve of the
FrenchRevolution, in THE TRiALJURY IN ENGLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY 1700-1900 13, 18-19 (Antonio Padoa Schioppa ed., 1987) (noting that during a single three- or four-day session, the court
would conduct between fifty and one hundred felony trials).
73 Langbein, supra note 71, at
282-83.
74 SeeJonakait, supra note 67; see also DAVIDJA CAIRNS, ADVOCACY
AND THE MAKING OF THE
ADvERSARIAL CRIMINAL TRIAL 1800-1865 47 (1998); Stephan Landsman, The Rise of the Contentious Spirit: Adversary Procedure in Eighteenth Century England 75 CORNELL L. REv. 497, 498
(1990).
7 See CAIRNS, supra note
74, at 47.
76 Id. (citation omitted). Cairns believes that this constraint
of thus having to convey an accused's story to the jury through cross-examination, rather than through any direct address,
maybe the origin of leading questions on cross-examination. See id.at 47-48.
SId. at 48.
78 But cf supra note 71 and accompanying
text.
See Friedman, supra note 69, at 1024 & n.73.
80 See infra notes 146-47 and accompanying
text.supra
81 See, e.g., Berger, supra note 29, at 579; Pollitt,
note 28, at 396-97.
8" Pollitt, supra note 28,
at 396.
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broadened the admiralty courts' jurisdiction to handle customs
suits.s3 As a result, trials were no longer before a jury but before a
single judge, with the deposition being the typical means of taking
testimony. According to this history, such procedures "reai-kened
in the colonists the need to assert what were considered to be the inalienable rights of Englishmen," including trial by jury and, presumably, the opportunity to cross-examine."
In practice, however, it is not clear that that need in fact fully
awoke. In Maryland, for instance, where a right to examine adverse
witnesses was explicitly granted in 1776,6James Rice has documented
only a slowly developing tendency in the eighteenth century for defense attorneys to actually engage in cross-examination."' Even after
Maryland granted that right, criminal jury trials there (as in England)
were typically quite short, lasting under one hour even into the nineteenth century.! The same seems to have been true in eighteenthcentury Virginia. In one apparently typical County Court, the court
heard ninety-seven cases of varying types over a two-day period."
Similarly, at one of the most celebrated trials of the Revolutionary
Era-that of the perpetrators of the so-called "Boston Massacre-attorneys conducted little cross-examination. 7 This %vastrue even given
pre-trial deposition of all of the witnesses, a long delay before trial to
examine those depositions, and an apparentlL' atypical stipulation
that the trial take place over more than one day.
These examples illustrate the dichotomy in both English and
American colonial history between cross-examination on the one
hand and confrontation on the other. Contrary to the traditional
equation of the two rights in Supreme Court jurisprudence, these examples help demonstrate the conclusion-reached in one of the
most extensive discussions of the history of the Confrontation
Clause-that even by the time of the Revolution "the relationship be-

83Id.at 396-97.
84 Id at 397-98.
Seesupranote 68 and accompan)ing text.
James D. Rice, The Criminal Trial Before and After the Lauerv Authorir, Law and Culture in
MaylandJuiy Trials, 1681-1837, 40 AM.J. LEGAL HIsT. 455, 463 (1996) (documnenting tie increasing use of defense lawyers in Maryland criminal trials in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century).
87Id.

9SCHARLEs T. OULLEN, ST. GEORGE TUCKER AND LAW INVIRGINIA 1772-1804 39-10 (1987).
"On the first day, this court heard twent)-eight cases, a small number ....On dte second day.
This was a normal case load for one day, which indithe court ...heard sixt)-nine cases ....
cates the small amount of time spent on each case." Id. at 40. Not all of these were full-blown
trials, of course, iU, but it is dear that brevity characterized those trials that did occur. Id.
See 30 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supranote 28. § 6345 n.747 and accompan)ing text. But se
Jonahait, sup-a note 67, at 137-38 (arguing that Boston Massacre defense la)-ers such as John
Adams cross-examined wimesses).
9D See3O WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supranote 28, § 6345 n.747 and accompanying text.
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tween confrontation, cross-examination, and the hearsay rule was still
indistinct to the point of invisibility." 9'
II. DEVOLUTION OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
UNDER THE SUPREME COURT

This last quote evokes another commonly discussed rule designed
to ensure the reliability of the testimony presented at trial, the hearsay rule.9- Although a comprehensive discussion of the rule is beyond
the scope of this Comment,9 3 analysis of the hearsay rule and of the
Confrontation Clause have been closely intertwined. In fact, this
close relationship has in part contributed to the Supreme Court's
current, arguably misleading, interpretation of the Clause.
This reading began about one hundred years ago, in Mattox v.
United States." The Mattox holding has become a bedrock of the Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause analysis:
The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits.... being used against the prisoner
in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in
which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection
and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand
face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by
his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.95

Three years later, however, the Court spoke in language that was
at least arguably more ambiguous: it held that a factual question
could only be decided against an accused "by witnesses who confront
him at the trial, upon whom he can look while being tried, whom he

91 Id. § 6346 n.12 and accompanying text.

I"See FED. R. EVID. 801-802 (rendering "hearsay," any out-of-court statement
"offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted," inadmissible). This proscription is relieved by
a number of exceptions. SeeFED. R.EVID. 803-804, 807.
93 For more thorough discussions of the rule, see generally 2 McCoR,
ICK ON EVIDENCE §
244-253 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992); Graham, supra note 33;John M. Maguire, The
Hearsay System: Around and Through the Thicket, 14 VAND. L. REv. 741 (1961); Mosteller, supra
note 28; Shaviro, supra note 28; I. Daniel Stewart,Jr., Perception, Memory, and Hearsay: A Criticism
ofPresent Law and the ProposedFederalRules ofEvidence, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 1; Symposium, Hearsay
Reform Conference, 76 MINN. L. REv. 363 (1992);John H. Wigimore, The History of the Hearsay Rule,
17 HARV.L. REv. 437 (1904); Mukasey, supra note 32.
94 156 U.S. 237 (1895). The Court had addressed issues falling under
the confrontation rubric previously, such as the importance of demeanor evidence leading to appellate deference to
the trial court regarding witness credibility. See, e.g., Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 75
(1895) (noting that the jury's opportunity to see witnesses' demeanor affords assistance in
weighing evidence); The Quickstep, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 665, 669 (1869) (stating that die trial
court is best able to reconcile differences in witnesses' testimony based on opportunity to "observe their demeanor, and compare their degree of intelligence").
95 Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242-43. But see Cline v. State, 36
S.W. 1099, 1108 (Tex. Crim. App.
1896) ("The rule in the Mattox Case is inappropriate in a case where the meaning is plain on
the face of the instrument."), over-ruled by Porch v. State, 99 S.W. 1122 (Tex. Crim. App. 1907).
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is entitled to cross-examine, and whose testimony he may impeach .... "w
The Court had little cause to revisit Confrontation Clause issues
until the 1960's, when the Clause was held applicable to the States
b
9 " That same
through the Fourteenth Amendment in Pointerv. Texa
year saw the birth pangs of disagreement about the scope of the
right(s) that the Clause affords: although some readings of Mallox
may have implied that both physical confrontation and crossexamination were fundamental to satisfying the Clause, the Court argued over whether either was truly indispensable and which was more
important 8
Both won. Exceptions to the absolute right of physical confrontation were sanctioned; but physical confrontation where possible uras
considered crucial to the Confrontation Clause in order to enable
cross-examination. 9 The two rights thus became conflated in the
Court's subsequent analysis, because physical confrontation was seen
as a means of ensuring cross-examination,m the "greatest legal engine
ever invented for the discovery of truth."'"'
This trend, and the conflation of the Confrontation Clause with
the hearsay rule, continued in subsequent Supreme Court cases. In
1980, the Court in Ohio v. Roberts combined the two explicitly, establishing a two-prong test for the application of the Confrontation
Clause when hearsay evidence is proposed.'03 The test focused explicitly on hearsay values or criteria-unavailability of the declarant and
Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899) (emphasis added). The Court's statements
are "ambiguous" because they use both justifications ("confront" and cross-examine") and
could thus mean that the two were not equated. Further, itis not dear whether what is in fact
meant is "confront" or "be confronted," and thus whether either was seen as equal or unequal
to cross-examination.
380 U.S. 400,406 (1965) (holding that the "confrontation guarantee.. is to be enforced
against the States under the Fourteenth Amendment" (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)).
98 Compare Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965) (taking the Maltoxand Craig approach and stating that "an adequate opportunity for cross-exantination may satisfy the clause
even in the absence of physical confrontation"), uwith California v.Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157
(1970) ("[T]his literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time of trial [forms] the core of the
values furthered by the Confrontation Clause."). Compare also Justice Harlan's concurring
at 172 (Clause satisfied without physical confrontation), withJusdce Brenopinion in Green, id.
nan's dissenting opinion in the same case, i. at 189 (Clause requires physical confrontation at

trial).

SeeBlumenthal, supranote 13, at 1182.
100See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990) ("The central concern of die Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting
it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.").
101WIGMORE, supra note 44, § 1367 at 32. Cf Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 351 (1955)
(Douglas, J., concurring) (arguing that confrontation and cross-examination are essential, because "[u]nder cross-examination [itnesses'] stories might disappear like bubbles. Their
whispered confidences might turn out to be yarns conceived by twisted minds or by people who,
though sincere, have poor faculties of observation and memory*).
IM448 U.S. 56 (1980).
10 Id. at 65.
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indicia of reliability.i°4 In its most explicit conflation of the two rights,
the Roberts Court noted that testimony can satisfy the Clause's "reliability" safeguards, "where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception."'0 5 Under Roberts, then, "hearsay falling within a
traditional or 'firmly rooted' exception to the [hearsay] rule will be
admissible under the Confrontation Clause."'0° Accordingly, the Roberts Court laid down the proposition described above: actual face-toface confrontation is not the focal right; rather, oath, crossexamination, and demeanor provide "all that the Sixth Amendment
demands: 'substantial compliance with the purposes behind the confrontation requirement.
This trend continued through the
1980's, with a departure from the focus on physical confrontation
and an assumption that, as with the hearsay rule, the reliability of the
testimony was the object of the confrontation right. Accordingly, the
Roberts hearsay factors were the focus of that right. 8
Finally, the end of the 1980's brought the tension discussed
above... between Coy v. Iowa"° and Maryland v. Craig,"' focusing again
on whether the procedural or the substantive aspect of the confrontation right was paramount, and placing the issue squarely in the context of child sex abuse cases. Again, however, each decision focused
on the importance of one of the two interpretations of the confrontation right: affording the opportunity to test the reliability of the witness by cross-examination and by observation of his or her demeanor.
Despite this jurisprudence, I suggest here that as a matter of text
and history, the right to confrontation implicates something different
from the hearsay rule,"2 different from the opportunity for crossexamination-indeed, different from the opportunity to test the reliability of witnesses' testimony before ajury.
What then does the right entail? A more detailed examination,
focusing on perhaps under-appreciated aspects of the Clause's text
and history, may help resolve its scope and meaning.
104Id.
105

Id. at 66.

106

2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 93,
§ 252, at 128.

Roberts, 448 U.S. at 69 (citation omitted).
108See Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986) (stating that the Clause
serves symbolic goals
and promotes reliability); Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987) (stating that rights under
the Clause are aimed at ensuring reliability at criminal trials). But see 30A WRIGHT & GRAHAM,
supra note 28, § 6361, at 776 & n.73 (citing approvingly a law review note that "helps to differentiate the hearsay rule from the right of confrontation because the latter is concerned with
more than merely the reliability of evidence used to prove guilt").
:09 See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
10 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
1 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
11 Cf Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476, 480 (4th Cir. 1958) (stating
that the Clause %as intended "to prevent the trial of criminal cases upon affidavits, not to serve as a rigid and inflexible barrier against the orderly development of reasonable and necessary exceptions to the hearsay rule").
113 See supra notes 66-91 and accompanying
text; infra notes 138-73 and accompanying text.
107
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HISTORY

A. Textual Origins of the Right to be Confronted
A number of developments suggest a different, perhaps narrower,
characterization of the Confrontation Clause. One factor, mentioned
above, is the obvious, but consistently ignored, fact that the Clause is
drafted in the passive voice-the right granted is "to be confronted,"
not "to confront." Most discussions in case law"' and by commentators1 15 transpose or conflate these terms without explanation, ith the
natural result that the right is discussed in terms of a defendant's active role in confronting, or examining, adverse witnesses.
Yet there is every reason to believe that the Framers' choice of
terms was quite deliberate. For instance, the alternative formulation
is present in the first State Constitution to be ratified, that of North
Carolina. The Declaration of Rights in that State's Constitution
granted every criminal defendant the right "to confront the accusers
and witnesses with other testimony. "" 6 Noteworthy is that not only is
the language chosen there in the active voice, but the Declaration
also grants a defendant the right to confront adverse itnesses "with
other testimony" 7 -i.e., the right, essentially, to cross-examine them
in order to impeach. Similarly, a more explicit right of physical confrontation, the right to meet an accuser or witness "face to face," was
granted in the Bills of Rights of at least two States."" Although both
of these constructions were available to the drafters of the Bill of
Rights, they chose neither. 9
114

See, ag., Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988) (holding that the Confrontation Clause pro-

rides criminal defendants the right to confront adverse witnesses); California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149,157 (1970) (discussing the right to confront the witness at trial).
"5 For a notable exception, see Friedman, supm note 69. at 1036 (noting
tie passive voice).
116 FRANcis H.

HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSnTIrrION OF THE UNITED

(emphasis added). See also
Maryland's proposal in reaction to the initially drafted Federal Constitution, affording a criminal defendant the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against hint but adding a separate
right "to examine the witnesses for and against him," supra note 68.
17 SeeHEH-ER, supra note 116, at 22.
"1 Massachusetts and New Hampshire. See infra note 160.
STATES: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 22 (1951)

Another, perhaps, less definitive textual argument is that dte Clause entities a defendant
to be "confronted with" the witmesses against him, radter tian -confronted I. dtem. The latter,
perhaps reminiscent of the ancient, even more literal -confrontations' of trial by battle, might
suggest a literal face-to-face confrontation. The former, however, might suggest iaving itnesses present in court to give their testimon)-i.e., die point is to produce die witnesses and
their testimony. This could as easily be done by aflidavit or deposition, simply having the defendant "confronted with" the witnesses' testimony. S, e.g., Herrmann & Speer. supra note 28,
at 543-44 (the goals of"respond[ing] to a witness's testimony and [having] questions put to die
witness ... could have been achieved simply by providing die defendant with die names of die
witnesses against him and their statements"). For that reason die Clause specifies being confronted with the witness. See the discussion of die term "itnesses against" infra note 134 and
accompanying text.
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Additional textual evidence about the intent of the Clause's drafters stems from its scant legislative history. During the First Congressional Congress, James Madison organized the development of the
constitutional amendments proposed by the various States that would
eventually become the Bill of Rights. 2 On June 8, 1789, Madison
submitted his proposed amendments to the House of Representatives; of the nine submitted, one, later to be adopted (with only two
2
changes) as the Sixth Amendment, read as follows: .
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, [by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed;] and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted ;,itl. his acertts and with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
2
in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.
On July 21 the proposed amendments were passed off to a select

Committee of Eleven, comprised of one member from each State.'2 '
Although this group completed its work within one week, discussion
of the amendments was tabled. On August 13, Madison spoke with
"anxiety" in favor of finally discussing the proposals, and
debate began. On August 17 and 18 the House of Representatives considered,
among others, the above proposal. Most debate centered around the
vicinage requirement, focusing on allowing a defendant to be tried

where the offense was committed.

The change relevant to the cur-

rent discussion was that the language securing a defendant's right to
be confronted with his accuser(s) was deleted by the Committee.' On
August 20 this slightly altered amendment was passed, and on August
24 was sent to the Senate for its approval. There is no indication that
this latter body suggested further changes regarding the confronta-

tion language, and in its present form the amendment was submitted for the States' ratification.
The Clause, then, was in fact substantively edited during its ratification. Historical sources, however, give no indication at whose behest the deletion was made and provide no records of this Commit-

:at 28.
121 HELLER,
Bracketedsupra
textnote
was 116,
added
during the amendment's ratification; struck-out text was removed.
12

1

ANNALS OF CONG. 452 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).

HELLER, supra note 116, at 30.
24 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note

:2

122, at 784-789.

3 Professor Heller notes that Senator William Maclay (Pennsylvania),
"whose Jounal is the
principal source of information on the proceedings of the Senate in the First Congress, was ill
during the period the amendments were debated in the Senate, and hence we are without
knowledge of the Senate's action on, and individual senators' reaction to, the proposed
amendments." HELER, supra note 116, at 31-32 (internal footnote omitted). Although individual senators may have discussed the text, the Senate did not formally suggest changes in tile
Confrontation Clause language before sending the amendments back to the House.
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tee's meetings.'" Nevertheless, several potential explanations for the
deletion may give some idea of the Committee members' intent.
First, the deletion might have been accidental; perhaps in the
Committee's recopying and redrafting, the words were inadvertently
omitted. This explanation does not seem credible; as the imeline
sketched above suggests, there wras ample time and opportunity to
correct such an oversight.
Second, the Clause may have been intended explicitly not to apply
to "accusers," only to adverse "witnesses." The distinction in fact
raises one of the ongoing discussions by the Supreme Court and by
commentators about the precise scope of the term "%itnesses."'' If,
as some suggest, the two terms were historically distinct,"- then the
emendation could reflect approval of either the sixteenth- and early
seventeenth-century English practice of distinguishing the "accusing
witness" (required to testify under oath) from other witnesses (who
did not),2 or of the older tradition of identifying a definite person
(i.e., other than the State) who brought suit against a defendant.""
Given Colonists' distaste of common law English criminal procedure,13 however, these distinctions seem implausible as well.
Finally, the words may have simply been seen as redundant; the
Committee may have believed that the right to be confronted with an
accuser was already present, presumably elsewhere in the Sixth
Amendment'ss If so, this redundancy was most likely located either
in the phrase "to be informed of the cause and nature of the accusation"1H (i.e., a reading that some form of notice of the charge or of
the indictment itself might satisfy the right), or in the phrase under
discussion, "witnesses against him." This latter gloss is in fact the
most common reading. "Witnesses against," though with some debate, generally has been taken to comprise both in-court testimony as
M See HELLER, supra note 116, at 33; see also E-mail from Charlene Bickford, Director, First
Federal Congress Project, to Jeremy Blumenthal (May 7, 1998, 17-2753 EDT) (on file %ith
author) ("[U)nfortunately there are no records from the (Select Committee] meetings . . .
197 See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 358, 359, 365 (1992) (Thomas. J., concurring
in part
and concurring in the judgment); see also, &g., AKHIL REED AMAR. THE CO.STITmON AND
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 89-144 (1997); 30 WRIGHT & GRAHAI, supra note 28. § 63,13 nnA5I-52
and accompanying text: Friedman, supra note 69. at 1022-26; Larkin, supra note 55. at 75-76:
Peter Westen, TheFutureofConfronlation,77 MICH. L RE',. 1185, 1187-88 (1979).
1 SeeS0 WRIGHT & GPAHA?, supranote 28, § 6343. at 326; i&L§ 63-17, at 76-1 & n.801.
1 See i. § 6343, at 323. Despite a historical distinction, of course, dte terms' meanings may
have coalesced by Colonial times, which would suggest an explanation closer to the redundancy
approach discussed next.
r
See LEONARD 1%. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 7 (1968) (noting the Norman
"a
custom requiring definite and known accuser, some private person who brought formal stilt
and openly confronted his antagonist").
1Si See, ag.,Jonakait, supra note 67, at 110-11 (suggesting that Revolutionary
times brought
strong Colonial aversions to many English institutions, including the reliance on the common
law).
1
Sep, e.g., Mosteller, supranote 28, at 748 n.277.
3 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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well as "formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions."
A final, perhaps less explicit, suggestion that "accusers" and "witnesses" were not seen as explicitly distinct comes again from the minimal ratification debates: a
change was proposed to the language of the Sixth Amendment that
no criminal prosecution could be had by way of "information."'3 The
proposal was deferred, 6 and then the next day defeated,'37 apparently on the grounds that the existing text already provided such protection.
B. HistoricalElements of the Right to be Confronted
As the preceding section suggests, both the text of the Clause and
some of the scant background of its ratification indicate that its drafters were motivated by something distinct from the right to crossexamine. But it seems evident, as well, that they intended something
more than the literal, procedural face-to-face confrontation. The history before the ratification of the Bill of Rights, therefore, may also
give a sense of what was intended by those who incorporated the
right into the various State Constitutions, as well as by those who initially reacted to the ratified federal Constitution.
A helpful starting point is, surprisingly enough, medieval times.)s
In an excellent historical review, Professor Frank Herrmann and
Brownlow Speer have meticulously traced the existence of a right to
confrontation from ancient Roman law through the Middle Ages.' 9
They describe two more or less parallel threads of a confrontation
right: the opportunity for a defendant to be present at his trial and
the "right to have accusing witnesses physically produced."'40 Although at times they conflate the two to some extent, they do identify
what I suggest is the primary focus of the confrontation right: ensuring that an adverse witness be brought into court to prove the validity
of his testimony. This testing of the validity of the evidence (i.e., asWhite v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas,J., concurring in part
and concurring
in thejudgment). Professor Friedman would use as a heuristic to determine whether evidence
falls under this phrase for Confrontation Clause purposes whether it is formally "testimonial,"
i.e., intended to be used against a defendant at trial. Friedman, supra note 69, at 1025-26.
1

s

See CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS:

THE DOCUMENTARY RECoRD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL.

CONGRESS 190 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991) (quoting proposed amendment by Mr. Burke).
136 Id. (quoting response by Mr. Hartley).
37 SeeTHE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supranote
68, at 390.
138 Of course, this is not surprising to some who trace
the history of the Confrontation Clause
back even further, to Biblical and Roman origins. See, e.g., Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015-16
(1988) (asserting that Roman custom dictated that a man could not be put to death without
having first faced his accuser).
1393
See Herrmann & Speer, supranote 28. For a closely related historical review, see Frank R.
Herrmann, The Establishment of a Rule Against Hearsay in Romano-Canonical Procedure, 36 VA. J.

INT'L L. 1 (1995). Differences between Professor Herrmann's two articles further highlight the
distinct scope and history of the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule.
140See Herrmann & Speer, supra note 28,
at 483.
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certaining that a particular witness and his testimony exist and that
the witness actually testifies to that which is adverse to a defendant),
as distinct from its reliability (i.e., the witness's credibility or the weight
to be accorded his testimony), actually was captured in medieval
times by precisely the words in question, "be confronted," rather than
"confront." Specifically, in fourteenth-century heresy trials, where
witnesses were typically interrogated secretly and there was little if any
opportunity for any kind of cross-examination, an Inquisitor's "handbook" nevertheless instructed that where inquisitors suspected that a
witness was testifying falsely against an accused, "they should arrange
for the accused to 'be confronted' (confrontari) with the suspected
false witness."141 Some aspect of the confrontation right as a test of

validitZ, then, was present in Continental medieval criminal procedure.
Note that the traditional reading of the Confrontation Clause reflects this approach, but only in part. As described above, confrontation analysis has historically relied heavily on the early Mallox language.1" Such analysis sees face-to-face confrontation as ensuring a
right of cross-examination." However, as sketched above, this traditional gloss focuses too much on cross-examination. A better interpretation of the Clause would have ended the Matiox language after
"prisoner," and the Dowdell language after "mx parteaffidavits."'
Such an interpretation would also better conform to the English
statutory (and sporadic common lav) protections that afforded a
right to some form of confrontation. The confrontation right in this
sense, ensuring an accusation's validity, may reach back even to

I&at 536.
Continental procedure concerning hearsa)y-concerning the reliability of testimony--did
exist in medieval times. See generally Herrmann, supra note 139. However, the nles against
hearsay gradually became lax across the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries, as they
increasingly became subject tojudicial discretion and abuse. Se, e.g.,Jeremy A. Blumenthal.
Shedding Some Light on Callsfor Hearsa Refonn: Citil Law Harsay.Rules in Historicaland MAodmi
Perspective; 13 PACE INT'L L REV. (forthcoming May 2001). More important, the extent to which
Romano-Canonical procedure of the medieval period in fact influenced developing English
AD
common law is unclear. See, eg., BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, "BEOND RLKsONA.LL DOut"
193"PROBABLE CAUSE": HLTORiCAL PERSPECIrvES ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LA.W OF EVlDLNCEX
200 (1991) (noting the difficulty of tracing the influence of European hearsay procedure on
Engish procedure).
See supranote 95 and accompanying text.
See supraIntroduction.
' The primary object of the constitutional provision in question %as to prevent depositions
or ex parte affidavits. ... being used against the prisoner... ." Mattox v. United States, 156
U.S. 237, 242 (1895). The Confrontation Clause %as 'intended to prevent the conviction of the
accused upon depositions or cc parfe affidavits." Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325. 330
(1911).
There is no question but that the opportunity to cross-examine is a right of paramount importance, see infra notes 181-84, and when it does "confound te false accuser." it does serve to test
the re/iabi!ty of evidence. But it is not the right that the Confrontation Clause was designed to
protect.
14
4
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Magna Carta in 1215.146 Chapter 38 prohibits an officer (a "bailiff")
from putting "any man on trial upon his simple accusation without
producing credible witnesses to the truth thereof"4-that is, without producing a valid accuser or witness. If one credits this language as representative of the confrontation right, one must question the nexus
between the Confrontation Clause and the cross-examination and
hearsay rules to the extent that these two rules stem from a desire to
guard against an impressionable jury. At this time, the jury as trier of
fact (i.e., rather than as a body of witnesses with knowledge of the
events in question) was in its infancy.
Next, in 1554, Parliament enacted a law that prescribed, in part,
that any adverse witness "shall, if living, and within the Realm, be
brought forth in Person before the party arraigned if he require the
same, and.., say openly in his Hearing, what they or any of them can
against him.' 4 8 Just four years later, a similar Act was passed which in
part required that "no [person] shall be hereafter indicted or arraigned for any offences [under] this act, unless [the accusing witnesses] shall be brought forth in person face to face before the party
to be arraigned.' 49 As Raleigh's subsequent trial indicated, however,
Parliament's effort to afford that confrontation right was soon defeated by judges hostile to the idea.s' In the mid-i 600's, for instance,
John Lilburne was repeatedly tried for publishing treasonous writings, and repeatedly he argued that "due process of the law [required
that] I and my accusers come face to face... before an ordinary magistrate [to see whether] they had any thing to lay to my charge."
Later, at Sir John Fenwick's 1696 trial for high treason, he argued
that "[o]ur law requires persons to appear and give their testimony
'viva voce,"" 52 though he too alluded to demeanor and crossexamination as important tests of witness credibility and evidence re146 See Pollitt, supra note 28, at 384-87 (suggesting that
confrontation in some form was recognized in England well before the right to jury trial).

147 See THE ESSENTIAL BILL OF RIGHTS:

ORIGINAL ARGUMENTS AND FUNDAMENTAt,

DOCUMENTS 14 (Gordon Lloyd & Margie Lloyd eds., 1998) (noting the "essential" right of a
man not to be put on trial without the production of "credible witnesses").
148 1 & 2 Philip and Mary, ch. 10 (1554), quoted in Blumenthal,
supra note 13, at 1177. Note
that the strictest of textual readings of this statute would in turn defeat the claim of face-to-face
confrontation as the core of the confrontation right-it implies that a defendant need only hear
the adverse witness. Thus, for instance, under a literal reading of this Act the Coy screen would
betapproved.
The Supremacy Act, 1 Eliz., ch. 1, § 37 (1558), quoted in 30 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note
28 , 6342 n. 274.
i50 See 30 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 28,
§ 6342, at 228; cf Wigmore, supra note 93, at 449
(mid-sixteenth-century efforts at statutory grant of confrontation right "remained by judicial
construction a dead letter").
151 See also Pollitt, supra note 28, at 389-90. Although
Lilburne was acquitted, it was not due to
any violation of this right. Moreover, he was also denied cross-examination, 30 WRIGH>T &
GRAHAM, supra note 28, § 6343 n.404 and accompanying text; again, the two rights were perceived as distinct, despite the "Wigmore-Harlan" interpretation.
152 Fenwick's Trial, 13 How. St. Tr. 537, 591-92 (1696), quoted
in Blumenthal, supra note 13, at
1178.
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liability.'53
Focus on the confrontation right preceded caution about ensur-

ing cross-examination, and such focus certainly preceded the development of a rule guarding against derivative evidence in general and
against hearsay in particular. Research continues to develop that despite some concern throughout Continental history about hearsay

evidence,' the rule against hearsay emerged only slowly in AngloAmerican legal practice. ss Professor Gallanis, for instance, has recently documented this slow evolution, suggesting that the rule only
took its fully modem shape in English
trial practice in the last twenty
4
years of the eighteenth century. 5
Early Colonial history demonstrates a similar concern for ensuring
the validity of testimony and accusations in the first place, before
questions about reliabilityarose. 5

At about the same time that Lil-

See Blumenthal, supra note 13, at 1178.
Herrmann, supra note 139; se also Blumenthal, supra note 142.
1 T.P. Gallanis, The Rise of Modern Evidiwe Lau, 84 lOWA L
REv. 499 (1999).
1ss I. at 534-35. "By the close of the eighteenth century ... the contours of the
modem rule
against hearsaywere largely in place." Id. at 535. It is also important in this context to note thmt
the rationa/efor the hearsay rule was in flux at this time-according to Professor Gallanis, it was
not until 1791 that the "modem" concern about the absence of cross-exasnination appeared.
Instead, for earlier scholars the reliability of derivative evidcnce %as questioned because the
testimony was not given under oath. Id. at 533 (citing eighteenth-cenDt'
treatises on evidence). Even so, cross-examination mas seen by the English public, at least, as an "entagle[ment]," as a means of"confusing what is dear, and involving what is simple." i. at 546,540
n.298.
Tension exists between Professor Gallanis's discussion and the history traced in Wigmaore.
supranote 93 (though the samples of cases they examined, of course, were different). Wigmore
documents cases from the 1600's and 1700's in which hearsay evidence---statements by extrajudicial speakers about evidence in the case--as at times excluded. In contrast to Gallanis,
Wigmore suggests that it was "between 1675 and 1690 that the fixing of tie [rnle against hearsay] takes place," id. at 445, and that by the "earl) 1700's" the reason for excluding hearsay was
the absence of cross-examination, i. at 448. Wigmore further proposes that Parliamentary debates about hearsay during Fenwick's trial "must have burned into the general consciousness
the vital importance of... cross-examinaton." Id. at 455. Noting the quotes adduced by Gallanis, supra note 155, as well as the discussion supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text. Wigmore's claim seems overly optimistic. In any case, although Wigmore's article is not cited. Gallanis certainly acknowledges the challenge in his history of WVigraore's standard account.Gallanis, supranote 155, at 505, 516.
For another useful discussion of this hearsay history and of cases from both equity and law
in the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries, see MiCHAEL R.T. NCN.MR. THE Lw OF PROOF
INEARLYMODERN EQUrIT 258-62 (1999).
1 Professor Gallanis's evidence about the slow development of tie hearsay rule in English
trial practice is interesting tojuxtapose with other evidence discussed here. First. his account is
another useful example of a potential distinction between ordinary trials and the nore commonlyanalyzed, higher-profile treason cases. Sesupra note 71. Second. it is useful to compare
English practice with American practice of the same time. For instance, hearsay %%sreferred to
in eighteenth-century American appellate case law at about te same time as Professor Gallanis
states that trial objections were developing in English practice, Gallanis, supra note 155. at 5-10.
See, e-g., Hollingsworth v%Leiper, I U.S. (1 Dall.) 161 (1786); Strickland's Lessee v. Poole, I U.S.
(1 Dall.) 14 (1765); Albertson v. Robeson, 1 U.S. (1 DaL) 9 (1764). As noted above, however.
in practice it is not clear to what extent American trial procedure in fact served to guard against
any perceived deficiencies in derivative evidence. See'supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
1
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burne was being tried in England, colonists were developing their
own reactions to English criminal procedure and to those royal Governors in the Colonies who represented that country. Virginia colonists, for instance, complained in 1624 of their Governor, who not
only encouraged trials "without giving the accused person any opportunity of knowing his accusation or accuser," but also pursued accusations of his own choosing "while the person accused is not admitted
to be confronted with, or defend against his defamers."' " Analogous
concerns about royal Governors, and/or about ensuring some right
to know one's accusers, were expressed in seventeenth-century Massachusetts, Connecticut, NewJersey, and Pennsylvania.'9
Similarly, such concerns found their way into most of the State
Charters and Bills of Rights that States drafted in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries.' 60 But the murkiness of the Clause's historical
development is present here as well: many historians agree that in
sifting and reworking the amendments from the State Constitutions
and the hundreds of State proposals reacting to the Federal Constitution,James Madison was influenced most by the Declaration of Rights
of his home state, Virginia.' 61 When he drafted the Confrontation
Clause, however, Madison did not use Virginian author George Mason's language; indeed, his proposed language was more of an amalgam of many State proposals, coming closest to those of New York
and Maryland.' 62
The important point is that despite the many available models referring to face-to-face confrontation of witnesses, to the examination
of witnesses, and to a related right to "confront" witnesses, the language ultimately selected, "to be confronted with," most closely reflects a preference for ensuring the validity of an accusation or a witness's testimony; other procedural rights as well as rules of evidence
were developing-albeit slowly'63-to ensure the reliability of such testimony.

Im Pollitt, supra note 28, at 391. Note not only the wording of the right sought to be recovered, but its separation from the right of examination.
_5,Id. at 391-95; see also THE CONiPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note
68, at 402-13 (collecting
language from State Constitutions).
I See 30 WRIGHT & GRAHAi, supra note 28, § 6346, at 611-12 (Virginia:
"to be confronted
with the accusers and witnesses;" North Carolina: "to confront the accusers and witnesses with
other testimony;" Delaware: "to be confronted with the accusers or witnesses;" Pennsylvania
and Vermont: "to be confronted with the witnesses;" Maryland: "to be confronted with the
witnesses against him;" Massachusetts and New Hampshire: "to meet the witnesses against him
face to face").
1 See id. § 6347, at 760-61.
62 The language of New York's proposal was "to be confronted
with his accusers and the witnesses against him," id. § 6347, at 761, and this language was ultimately proposed to tie Select
Committee, see supra note 122. For Maryland's form of the confrontation right, see supra note
68.
" See Gallanis, supra note 155.
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C. The Concurrencein White v. Illinois
Finally, a focus on the validity/reliability distinction reflects a tension in one of the Court's most recent Confrontation Clause cases,
White v. Ilinois,6 ' where the Court rejected a historical reading with
some similarity to the validity/reliability approach. At issue wvas testimony by several adult witnesses concerning a four-year-old victim's
out-of-court statements to them about the defendant's actions. The
child's mother was allowed to testify that shortly after the assault, the
child told her that the defendant "had choked and threatened her."'
Similarly, the police officer who responded to the mother's call wvas
allowed to testify to his interview with the child, and various medical
personnel who examined the child were also allowed to testify to her
statements to them. The child, however, did not testify at trial."
The Court rejected a historical reading suggested by the United
States as amicus curiae, that,
the Confrontation Clause's limited purpose is to prevent a particular
abuse common in 16"'- and 17"b-century England: prosecuting a defendant through the presentation of ex parte affidavits, without the affiants
ever being produced at trial. Because [the child's] statements do not fit
this description, the United States suggests that [she] is not a wimess
against" [the defendant] within the meaning of the Clause.
The Court considered this approach too narrow a reading of the
Confrontation Clause, as it would "eliminate its role in restricting the
admission of hearsay testimony," and as such the argument came "too
late in the day to warrant reexamination of th[e] approach" to the
Clause previously taken by the Court.'6
In his concurrence, Justice Thomas questioned whether this need
be so. Consistent with the discussion here, Justice Thomas suggested
that the White Court's approach may have "unnecessarily... complicated and confused the relationship between the constitutional right
of confrontation and the hearsay rules of evidence."',9 In particular,
he noted that the reading suggested by the United States (and by this
Comment) may in fact better reflect the text and history of the Confrontation Clause; otherwise, the rights afforded by the Clause take
the contours of the hearsay rule and little else.' .a
Justice Thomas is correct that the Court's line of Confrontation
Clause interpretation this century has focused too closely on the

502 U.S. 346 (1992).
10 1&at 349.
66 I at 349-50.
26

167

Id. at 352.

i6s I& at 352-53.
169

it at 358 (ThomasJ. concurring in part and concurring in thejudgrnent). Justice Scalia

joined in the concurrence. I&
,-0
Id. at 364-66 (Thomas,J., concurring in part and concurring in thejudgment).
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nexus between the Clause and the hearsay rule,7 a nexus that is perhaps more attenuated than has been assumed. The fact that a more
accurate historical reading" - would reduce the Confrontation
Clause's role in restricting the admissibility of hearsay testimony is not
a significant criticism, and is hardly a fatal flaw. Despite claims as to
their similar focus, the Confrontation
Clause and the hearsay rule
3
have distinct purposes and histories."'
Justice Thomas's interpretation is inaccurate, however, is in his assumption that "the text of the Sixth Amendment supports the Wigmore-Harlan view,"1" 4 i.e., that the Confrontation Clause rights bottom themselves on the opportunity for cross-examination.
My
approach thus agrees with the problems that Justice Thomas, and
more recently Justice Breyer, identified in the Court's Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence, but disagrees with his reasoning as to why.
Neither cross-examination nor the hearsay rule is the basis for the
right to confrontation. Both focus on the reliability of testimony; the
Clause was designed to ensure its validity. 175
CONCLUSION

I have suggested, based on the text and the history of the Confrontation Clause, that the Supreme Court's current equation of the
confrontation right with either precluding hearsay and/or ensuring
cross-examination (i.e., testing the reliability of the evidence), or with
simple face-to-face, physical confrontation, departs from the history,
scope, and original intent of the Clause. That intent was more focused: based on the historical abuses that its Drafters wanted to protect against, they designed the Clause to ensure that valid testimony
(accusations in particular) was the only means of convicting a defendant. Again, in the language I have used, its Framers' intent was to
ensure the validity of adverse witnesses' testimony, rather than its reli-

See id. at 356 ("[W]here proffered hearsay [fits] within a firmly rooted exception to hearsay rule, the Confrontation Clause is satisfied."); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970)
(observing that "it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are
generally designed to protect similar values").
1" Justice Thomas pointed out that the Court
"has never explored the historical evidence on
this point," White, 502 U.S. at 362 (Thomas, J.,concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). The Court has, of course, but its historical readings have been problematic, due to its
conflation of the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule.
1 See also, e.g., Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 140
(1999) (BreyerJ., concurring) (noting that
"the Confrontation Clause itself has ancient origins that predate the hearsay rule").
174 White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 364 (1992) (Thomas,J,
concurring in part and concurring
in the
judgment).
175 In other contexts, the Court has noted the distinction between validity and reliability. See,
e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 n.9 (1993) ("We note that
scientists typically distinguish between 'validity' (does the principle support what it purports to
show?) and 'reliability' (does application of the principle produce consistent results?)").
171
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abilit); 6 the related, still-developing right of cross-examination %%-as
seen as serving that function.
Is it, however, "too late in the day""' to recapture this narrower
meaning of the Clause? What would be the implications of adopting
such a meaning?
In one sense, perhaps little would change. Both "sides" of the debate, the procedural (physical face-to-face confrontation) and the
substantive (reliability or cross-examination focus), are to some extent correct-on one hand, the need to produce witnesses is a procedural one, in order to show that an accusation or piece of testimony
is not trumped-up. But it is not true that literal face-to-face confrontation is the core of this Sixth Amendment right. If it were, such language was available to James Madison when he drafted the amendments and could easily have been incorporated into what is now the
Sixth Amendment, as it was in the Massachusetts and New Hampshire
Constitutions. m Similarly, though the term "cross-examination" may
or may not have been in common usage,' some variant could have
been used had that specific right been explicitly intended. Finally,
the right to "confront" was an explicit alternative, in contrast to the
right that was chosen, "to be confronted."'t The choice evidently
made must be taken seriously, if we are to credit the plain meaning of
the Confrontation Clause.
Similarly, what impact would such narrowing have on the right to
cross-examine? The right certainly has been located in the Sixth
Amendment right of confrontation,"' but under my proposed reading, is it still of constitutional dimension?
Perhaps a simplistic answer is an appeal to precedent: by now the
right to cross-examine-to test the reliability of evidence brought at
trial-is considered essential and fundamental to a fair trial."2 Aca76Cf. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 142 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring) ('[11t is debatable
whether the Sixth Amendment principally protects 'trustworthiness,' rather than 'confronta-

tion.'"); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 862 (1990) (Scalia,J., dissenting) ('IT]lie Confrontation Clause does not guarantee reliable evidence; it guarantees specific trial procedures that
were thought to assure reliable evidence."); Richard D. Friedman. Discu

n: Confronlation and

the Utility of Rules, 16 Miss. C.L REv. 87, 94 (1995) ("1 do not think that the [confrontation]
right is a reliability-based one at all; if it is conceived to be a protection against unreliable evidence it will, indeed, break down.").
1i White, 502 U.S. at
353.
7 See THE COMiPLErE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 68, at 404 (MassachuseS 'to meet the
wimesses against him face to face"); i. at 405 (New Hampshire, same).
179 30 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 28, § 6345, at 544.
0 See notes 116-19, supra,and accompanying text.
1 See, eg., Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); Brookhan v.Janis, 3&1 U.S. 1 (1966).
1 Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968); Brooklart v. Janis. 384t U.S. 1 (1966). Note that
some commentators have implied that the emphasis on confrontation in criminal cases indicates it should not be equated with the ensuring of evidentiary reliability through crossexamination, because cross is present in civil cases as well. Eg. MukasLy. supra note 32. at 1438
("[I]f there exists this basic and extensive concern ith minimal reliability, it should not be
confined to criminal cases as it would be under the confrontation clause.). Of course, one response is the added importance of ensuring proper accusatorial evidence in criminal, more
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cordingly, its importance cannot be reduced even if it was not precisely intended to be a feature of the Confrontation Clause. Given
the procedural nature of cross-examination, and the perception of
how integral it is to a fair trial, it might plausibly be considered a feature of substantive (or procedural) due process instead.'
Alternatively, of course, the right to cross-examine still could be implicit in
the Clause, as is generally assumed. Wigmore and others may simply
have been wrong in assuming that cross-examination was all the
Clause stood for. It seems just as reasonable, based on the Clause's
text and history, to suppose that although the goal of the Confrontation Clause was to ensure the validity of testimony, rather than its reliability, one obvious consequence of requiring that a witness be
brought into court is what can then be done with that witness-e.g.,
cross-examine him.'8
Finally, returning to the first part of this Comment, what specific
implications might this narrower reading of the Clause have, especially in the context of child sex abuse prosecutions? Are Justice
Scalia's strong objections'8 warranted?
Although the reading here may ultimately result in consequences
closer to Justice O'Connor's looser interpretation in Craig, both the
literal and the liberal interpretations are partially correct (and partially incorrect). Justice Scalia's objections in Craig,Danner,and Marx
focused over-much on the use of closed-circuit television to facilitate
the presentation of a child witness's testimony, and therefore focused
on the lack of face-to-face confrontation between defendant and witness. But as shown above, aspects of Justice Scalia's reading are essential to maintain as well. The Constitutional rights afforded by the
than civil, cases. But, in turn, this response emphasizes the added importance of ensuring valid
testimony in criminal cases, where rules of evidence may also work to ensure reliable testimony.
183 U.S. CONST., amends. V, XIV. See also Chambers
v. Alississippi,410 U.S. 284 (1973), where
confessions exculpating the defendant were excluded, and the confessors were not crossexamined. As the confessions had been given "under circumstances that provided considerable
assurance of their reliability," id. at 300, the exclusion was held improper, though it was unclear
as to how strongly this holding was based in the confrontation right. To use language from Justice Thomas's concurrence to emphasize the point here, "[r]eliability is more properly a due
process concern." White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 363-64 (1992). See also Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400, 409-10 (1965) (Harlan,J., concurring in the result); Edward R. Becker, InsuringReliable Fact Findingin Guidelines Sentencing: Must the Guaranteesof the Confrontation and Due Process
Clauses be Applied, 151 F.R.D. 153, 168-69 (1993) (procedural aspects "of the Due Process
Clause subsume[] confrontation values"); Mukasey, supranote 32, at 1438 (arguing that evidentiary reliability should be enforced "through the due process clause, not the confrontation
clause").
184 Indeed, too extreme a reading of the discussion
here could frame the Clause as only requiring a prima facie showing as to a witness's testimony that is then more rigorously tested by
cross-examination, a notion that would simply return to Wigmore's view that "confrontation [is]
merely the dramatic preliminary to cross-examination." Gutman, supranote 26, at 333 (quoting
S. GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 163f (16th ed.J. Wigmore ed. 1899)). As
should be clear from my discussion of Wigmore's approach, that is, of course, not the intended
point.
18 See supra note
2.
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Confrontation Clause must be more robust than rules of evidence,"'
and it is essential that the accuser and his testimony be rigorously

tested in order to ensure its validity. Thus, this reading might reconcile the two approaches, the "liberal" and the "literal," in the context
of child sex abuse cases. For instance, it would condone live testimony by a child witness by means of closed-circuit television,'F the
live closed-circuit television testimony in Gigant or even the screen
thatJustice Scalia ruled unconstitutional in Co.,! ' s because the testifying or accusing witness has been brought to court, supporting the
evidence's validity<" (and is subject to cross-examination, which can
evaluate its reliability). Accordingly, the Court was correct to deny
certiorari in Marx and Danner,and was right in Craig. It was correct,
however, for the wrong reasons, and it is important to understand the
somewhat narrower reasons by which it should have made its decisions, especially if calls to re-evaluate the Court's Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence are heeded.' 9° Mallox wras right in focusing attention on the absent accuser, but its language, and the language in
the Supreme Court cases following it, suggesting a confluence of the
Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule have been misleading.
This Comment has traced in part that narrower basis for the confrontation right involved in those decisions; when the Court heeds such
calls for reconsideration, the present discussion may help clarify the
scope of the Clause, emphasizing the important right "to be confronted," rather than "to confront."

See Friedman, supra note 69.
e&g.,
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
1
SeeCoy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
189 The testimony may of course still be subject to the rule against hearsay,
and though satisfying confrontation analysis, testimony may nevertheless be excluded under e-identiary rules
(one way of testing testimony's ediabii.q). But as has been repeatedly avowed-in theory, anywa-the Confrontation Clause was not intended to constitutionalize the rule against hearsay.
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970). But semsupra Introduction; see aso Mhite v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346,366 (ThomasJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (Athough the Court repeatedly has disavowed any intent to [suggest that the Confrontation
Clause constitutionalizes the hearsay rule], I fear that our decisions have edged ever further in
that direction.") (citations omitted); 2 McCouIcxON EVIDENc , supranote 93. § 252. at 126 &
n.14 ("recent decisions of the Supreme Court seem to point strongly in [that] direction"). But
cf.Jonakait, supra note 67, at 81 ("[T]he Confrontation Clause, and related Sixth Amendment
provisions, sought to constitutionalize criminal procedure as it then existed in the states. ").
190 See supra note 2; Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 143 (1999) (BreyerJ., concurring) (question of reevaluating connection between hearsay rule and Confrontation Clause may be left
.open for another day"); LeadingCases-B. Criminal Law and Protdure, 113 HARV. L RLv. 233.
243-44 (1999) (notingsame).
19

1See,

